

CIFREM SEMINARS

TRUST, TRUTH, STATUS AND IDENTITY AN EXPERIMENTAL INQUIRY

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at 3.30 PM - DISA seminar room
Faculty of Economics- Via Inama, 5***

In an experiment involving a standard trust game and a costless signalling game, it is demonstrated that economically relevant norm-based behaviors (trust, reci- procity and truth-telling) vary with social identity.

The experimental procedure induced two trivial social identities. In one version, a status difference was induced. The results permitted a succinct description of identity effects: subjects held own-group members to a higher standard; and high status sub jects held everyone, including themselves, to a higher standard. To illustrate the “high status/high standards” phenomenon, subjects’ “standards” were estimated from a simple identity model for a subset of the data.